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8.1 Introduction
Slavery and slave resistance have been core issues in the post-war historio-
graphy of the Caribbean.1 At the same time, massive migration from the
British, Dutch and French Caribbeans to Europe has literally brought the
legacies of colonialism and hence slavery home to the former metropolitan
countries. Virtually all Caribbean nations, moreover, are thoroughly trans-
national today. One of the consequences of this post-colonial condition has
been the emergence of what is now generally known as ‘the Black
Atlantic’, a concept coined by Gilroy (1993). The shared history of ensla-
vement provides a central point of reference within this Black Atlantic. It
also provides inspiration for narratives of history that gloss over fundamen-
tal differences within the history of Atlantic slavery.
This chapter addresses the recent Dutch rediscovery and, at times, per-
haps reinvention of the Netherlands’ long history of slave trade and slavery
in relation to the impact of the post-war migration from the Dutch
Caribbean. A first issue is the overall impact of post-colonial migration –
from Indonesia and the Caribbean – on the way Dutch history is canonised.
The next sections provide a succinct analysis of the significance of slave
trade and slavery in the various realms of the Dutch colonial empire, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the recent and relatively successful impact of the
Caribbean demand to accept African slavery as an integral part of Dutch
national history. The final sections discuss the contested issue of the lega-
cies of slavery and the issue of ‘black’-versus-‘white’ perspectives; ques-
tion whether Black Atlantic interpretations indeed help us see New World
slavery and its legacies with fresh eyes; debate the concept and uses of
‘cultural trauma’; and, finally, offer some reflections on the position of
historians.
A word regarding the background to this chapter is appropriate. Three
Dutch historians of slavery have been particular vocal on these issues in
the Netherlands and have therefore become voluntary or reluctant actors in
the field at the same time. Emmer and Van Stipriaan, both highly respected
for their scholarly work, have represented some strongly opposing views
on these matters. A third historian engaged in these debates is the present
author, who should probably be located somewhere between the other two.
A good deal of this chapter therefore derives from publications by these
three authors as well as from the present author’s ongoing engagement
with these issues. A good outsider’s analysis is provided by Kardux.2
8.2 A historical canon for a post-colonial metropolis
World War II sparked the decolonisation of the Dutch empire and, even
more unexpectedly to the Dutch, the first of a series of post-colonial migra-
tions. The total number of immigrants from Indonesia in the 1945-1962
period is estimated at around 300,000. This figure is negligible in compari-
son to an Indonesian population of roughly one hundred million in the late
1940s, but involved the overwhelming majority from the circles where
most of these immigrants originated, i.e. Dutch colonials and Indo-Dutch.
Today, over half a million Dutch citizens have some Indonesian roots.
Whereas this first chapter of decolonisation thus caused unrepresentative
and comparatively insignificant migration, the 1975 transfer of sovereignty
to Surinam sparked an exodus involving colonial citizens of all classes,
ethnicities and generations, a cross-section of the entire population. Over
the next decades, the demographic growth of the Surinamese community
would be a largely Dutch affair. Today, the country houses some 475,000
inhabitants, as against a Surinamese community of some 335,000 in the
Netherlands. According to the 2004 Surinamese census, roughly half of the
Surinamese population has African roots.
Large-scale Antillean migration to the Netherlands, mainly from Cura-
çao, dates from the late 1980s and beyond. Again, the numerical signifi-
cance of the migration lies primarily on the islands themselves. This Antil-
lean migration is not representative by origins, as the overwhelming major-
ity hails from one island only. But again, in other dimensions the migrants
form a cross-section of the insular population. The total population of the
six islands is estimated at 280,000. The Antillean community in the Neth-
erlands in 2006 stood at 130,000. The great majority of the Antillean com-
munity in the Netherlands is of African origins.
With an estimated one million taken together, the share of Dutch citizens
with colonial or post-colonial roots in the total population is considerable.
The number of Dutch people with ‘roots’ in Indonesia is estimated at just
over half a million; the number with Caribbean origins at just under half a
million; the number of Dutch citizens whose presence in the Netherlands
has a prehistory going back to the Atlantic slave trade is some 300,000;
probably half of the Surinamese Dutch are of Asian origins.3
Colonial history has literally come home with these successive waves of
post-colonial migration. The post-colonial presence became immediately
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evident in demographics, but more recently also in debates on Dutch iden-
tity and culture. Just as in other countries of the ‘old’ Europe, progressive
European unification and large-scale immigration have provoked new, of-
ten fierce debates on national identity and the extent to which immigrants
can and should adhere to ‘national’ traditions and values. By conventional
Dutch standards, these debates have been unusually heated, hovering be-
tween the two extremes of conservative essentialism and unconditional
praise of multiculturalism.
The rise of a post-colonial community of one million in the Netherlands
has had an unmistakable and in some ways salutary impact on the Dutch
debates on national identity. The colonial antecedents of Dutch history
have been more strongly and critically incorporated in the national narra-
tive than ever before. Post-colonial identity politics certainly played a role
here. ‘History’, implying an imputed Dutch collective guilt handed down
through the generations, was used as a strong argument, particularly by
leaders of post-colonial migrant communities. The Dutch government
responded accordingly in the past decades, supporting and subsidising
commemorations, statues and museums, research projects and the like for
post-colonial migrant communities.
In all of this, we witness present governments acknowledging responsi-
bility for – from a contemporary perspective – morally dubious or outright
immoral state actions going back decades and even centuries. Perhaps
seeking some kind of moral redemption, but also trying to enhance social
cohesion, the state answers to the urges of its post-colonial citizenry. This
does not necessarily lead to consistent rewritings of the past. The Dutch
East India Company (the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Dutch,
VOC) is celebrated while shame and remorse dominate the memory of the
Dutch West India Company (Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in
Dutch, WIC). This contrast has something to do with the different trajec-
tories of the two companies, but arguably as much or more with the will-
ingness to respond to post-colonial migrants’ divergent ideas about these
pasts.
Whatever the inconsistencies and moral challenges, the ‘repatriation’ of
post-colonial migrants has had the effect of bringing colonial history back
into the canonical version of national history. This is best illustrated in the
recently coded canonical version of Dutch history defined by a government
commission and subsequently accepted as the model for primary and early
secondary school history education. The new canon, available online
(www.entoen.nu) testifies to an enhanced awareness of the significance of
colonialism in and for Dutch history. Of the 50 ‘windows’ comprising
Dutch history, five are exclusively about colonial history, while several
other windows have a colonial dimension. Nowhere do we come across
glorification of colonialism, the perspectives varying from neutral to expli-
citly critical.
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Once we move to renderings of colonialism outside of academia, the
picture becomes more blurred and one encounters more self-congratulatory
perspectives on colonialism. Dutch colonialism in Asia evokes mixed
memories, while the Dutch Caribbean history is mainly equated with slav-
ery and therefore shame. This lack of balance reflects the contemporary
framework in which colonial history is reinserted in the national narrative.
There is a geopolitical context in which the Netherlands prides itself of
having been among the pioneers of globalisation, but expresses embarrass-
ment regarding colonialism as such and, in particular, as to its excesses.
This intermingles with a domestic context in which post-colonial migrant
communities demand that their voices be heard in the new narrative of
Dutch national history.
In all of these debates, we may observe that leaders of post-colonial mi-
grant communities have successfully capitalised on shared history. This
need not necessarily mean claiming older and priority rights to full citizen-
ship over and above the other ethnic minorities in the country, but at times
precisely that implication is voiced. Cultural affinity then becomes an addi-
tional argument. In order words, as a late vengeance, references to coloni-
alism become forceful arguments for full and undisputed contemporary
citizenship.
The Atlantic slave trade and slavery in the Caribbean colonies are
increasingly singled out as the nadir of colonial history. In 2000, 7 per cent
of a representative sample of Dutch citizens indicated that among all epi-
sodes of Dutch history commending shame, the Dutch participation in the
slave trade was at the top of their list of embarrassment. Four years later,
this proportion had increased to 16 per cent. By 2008, this was up to 24
per cent, making the Dutch participation in the slave trade the answer most
frequently given to this question. No other episode in Dutch history elicits
more embarrassment (De Geschiedeniskrant 26 March 2008).
The pendulum continues to swing though. The VOC celebrations contin-
ued in spite of widespread irritation in countries implicated with the com-
pany such as Indonesia, India and South Africa, and well-publicised criti-
cism by Dutch scholars. A backlash regarding official Dutch remorse about
the WIC and Atlantic slave trade is not altogether unthinkable either. There
has been no shortage of radical xenophobic websites denouncing monu-
ments and remorse for slavery as nonsensical. Shortly before he was mur-
dered in 2002, populist right-wing political leader Pim Fortuyn accepted
the facts of Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade, but ridiculed
inherited guilt and reparation claims. In 2005, one of his later and most
successful epigones, Rita Verdonk, then a member of cabinet, made a
highly disputed official representation at the annual Emancipation Day cel-
ebrations in Amsterdam. But by 2008, launching her new political move-
ment ‘Trots op Nederland’ (‘Proud of the Netherlands’), she complained
that ‘everywhere in the Netherlands, monuments for slavery are erected
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[that] depict our culture as awful’. One may well assume she anticipated
many potential Dutch voters would support this firm stance (Fortuyn 2002:
158).4
8.3 Slave trade and slavery in the East and West Indies
We may well assume that the respondents’ shame about the Dutch involve-
ment in slave trade and slavery was exclusively linked to the Atlantic sys-
tem. The Dutch involvement with slave trade in the Indian Ocean and
colonial slavery in the territory covered by the VOC has received only
slight scholarly interest and no public interest at all. This is actually one of
the reasons the quadricentennial of the VOC establishment could be exten-
sively celebrated in the Netherlands, an act unthinkable for the WIC
(Oostindie 2003: 153).
Slave trades and slavery in the Dutch East and West Indies were two cir-
cuits that functioned virtually independent of one another, but lend them-
selves very well for comparison. This includes the scale and organisation
of the slave trade, number and origin of the slaves, their economic impor-
tance to the colonies, contrasts between indigenous and foreign slavery,
slavery regimes, inter-ethnic relations, creolisation and local cultural forma-
tion and, finally, abolition and emancipation.
Several conclusions may be drawn from recent tentative research, parti-
cularly the work of Vink (2003) and Van Welie (2008). First, the numbers
game. The Dutch role in the Atlantic slave trade has long been established.
Over the centuries, Dutch slavers were minor players, embarking some
555,000 or 5 per cent of the 12.5 million enslaved Africans destined for
the ‘middle passage’ across the Atlantic. In the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, however, the share of the Dutch was more prominent
and they were also instrumental in exporting the sugar-and-slavery model
from Brazil to the Caribbean.
Whereas the Dutch slave trade is mostly thought of as an Atlantic phe-
nomenon, historians have long known that the VOC also engaged in slave
trade. In a pioneering article, Vink (2003) suggested that the Dutch Indian
Ocean slave trade was actually more voluminous than it was in the
Atlantic. Van Welie’s discussion of the literature and evidence makes it
clear that the methodological and conceptual issues are far more compli-
cated for the Asian slave trades than for the Atlantic area. Even short of
satisfactory quantitative series, we may confidently say that in the East,
too, the Dutch were active and unscrupulous buyers of slaves – in the
realm of the VOC, enslaved Asians and, to a lesser degree, Africans sup-
plied by local traders. The Dutch partners in oceanic trade were Asians,
particularly Chinese and also Africans.
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Up to the abolition of slavery (1863 in the Dutch case), slave labour
formed the backbone of the colonies in the Americas – slave-produced tro-
pical produce was the raison d’être of these colonies. Dutch Brazil and,
even more, the Guyanas were typical plantation economies, with enslaved
Africans making up a massive majority of the population. Conversely, in
most of the Asian settlements and colonies, slave labour was mainly urban
and incidental to other forms of locally procured labour, whether bonded
or not. Slaves formed a tiny minority in the overall population of the Asian
colonies. Only in places such as Batavia, Banda and Ambon did they make
up half the population by the late seventeenth century and hence had a
more significant impact.
Much has been written on the absence of a serious abolitionist move-
ment in the Netherlands regarding the Atlantic slave trade and slavery.
Drescher (1994) presented the classic analysis of the Dutch paradox over
two decades ago. Clearly, this lack of abolitionist fervour is not that atypi-
cal in a European, let alone global, context. Yet, it contrasts strongly with
the exceptional British case and also with nationally cherished ideas about
Dutch progressiveness and humanitarianism. Studies on slave owners’ atti-
tudes in the Dutch Caribbean only confirm this sobering observation.
Again, the study of Dutch attitudes towards enslavement in Asia is only in
its infancy. There is no indication, however, that Dutch colonialism has a
more commendable record here. Perhaps it was even easier to conceive of
slavery as self-evident in Asia than in the Americas. In Asia, the Dutch,
like other Europeans, simply participated in pre-colonial networks of slave
trade and Europeans were certainly not exceptional in their deployment of
slaves.5
Historians are generally weary about generalisations regarding slavery’s
variants of ‘mild’ versus ‘harsh’, even more so when such variations are
explained through reference to criteria such as the national or cultural
backgrounds of slave owners. Wherever there is slavery, abuse is endemic;
so is slave resistance. Nonetheless, we may possibly discern some contrasts
between the practice of slavery in the Dutch Atlantic and Dutch Asia. For
all we know, for most enslaved, slavery in Asia would imply urban and
domestic rather than agro-industrial labour, was more gender-balanced and
implied lesser racial and ethnic distinctions. As a consequence, manumis-
sion was far more common, as was the likeliness that the descendants of
manumitted slaves would be fully incorporated in the wider society, not
necessarily in the lower classes. For most Asian slaves, there was no such
thing as the dreaded middle passage, and probably lesser racial stigmatisa-
tion and alienation.
While this hypothesis awaits scholarly scrutiny, it is useful for present
purposes to highlight another dimension of the history of slavery.
Throughout the Americas as well as in the Afro-Caribbean diaspora in
Europe, the Atlantic slave trade and New World slavery are crucial to the
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way descendants of these enslaved Africans think of themselves, colonial
history and contemporary issues ranging from racism to achievement.
Conversely, their visible African ancestry makes them victims of this his-
tory identifiable to all. Slavery, in a sense, has remained, or has become a
central feature in Afro-American identity.
Nothing of this sort applies to the former Dutch colonies in Asia.
Remember that slavery was not nearly as dominant in the Asian territories
as it was in the Americas. Moreover, it is difficult to point at legacies of
slavery or at descendants of slaves – and where this is possible, in
Indonesia, one would more likely be dealing with traces of the indigenous
slavery that both preceded and outlasted colonial slavery. In other words,
whereas colonial history itself does not have the contemporary weight
in Asia that it has in the Caribbean, slavery evokes even less living
memories.6
8.4 Commemorating Atlantic slavery: Gestures and dissonance
For all practical purposes, the ‘Dutch’ memory of slavery is narrowed
down to – in this order – Surinam, the Antilles and perhaps Africa, symbo-
lised by the Elmina fortress in Ghana. The Dutch involvement with slavery
in the domain of the VOC has been largely forgotten. The same, inciden-
tally, applies to enslavement of Dutch citizens in Northern Africa in the
early modern period. The rediscovery of slavery in Dutch history is there-
fore partial and corresponds to a particular demand in Dutch society ex-
pressed mainly by the Afro-Caribbean community.
Since the late 1990s, Dutch government and institutions in the public
arena have been forthcoming in financing and otherwise supporting initia-
tives to commemorate Atlantic slavery. In the presence of the Dutch queen
and prime minister, a national commemorative monument was inaugurated
in Amsterdam on Emancipation Day, 1 July 2002. The Nationaal Instituut
Nederlands Slavernijverleden en Erfenis (National Institute for the Study
and Documentation of Slavery and its Legacy, NINSEE), was established
one year later in Amsterdam. Zeeland, once the major slave trade province,
followed suit in 2005 with its own monument, in Middelburg. In 2006, the
beautiful, early 17th-century mansion of the Amsterdam mayor was nailed
with a plaque indicating that one of its first inhabitants was an official of
the WIC with a special assignment of the Atlantic slave trade.
Invariably, such inaugurations went accompanied with solemn declara-
tions. Members of the Dutch cabinet expressed ‘deep remorse’, as did the
future Dutch king, on a visit to Ghana. Cultural institutions financed by
the Dutch state embarked on a wide variety of initiatives, ranging from the
publication of books, through the creation of genealogical databases at the
national archives and restoration projects, to a series of exhibitions in
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various museums and documentaries aimed at school children. Media cov-
erage was extensive and helped raise public awareness on the issue – pos-
sibly triggering the later chauvinistic backlash as well.
There is irony, perhaps bitter irony, in the fact that the initiative in all of
this was definitely metropolitan, with Surinam and the Antilles obtaining
second servings most of the time. The successful Caribbean lobby in the
Netherlands to ‘unsilence’ the slavery past has inadvertently served to
strengthen the metropolitan hold on the digestion of colonial history. Of
course ‘metropolitan’ now includes views and players from the Caribbean
community but, even so, the historical asymmetry continues to be repro-
duced.
Within the Netherlands, the urge to accept Atlantic slavery as part and
parcel of Dutch history may have been spectacularly successful, but this
does not mean that there is no dissonance. There is an at times heated
debate about that. In a recent analysis of the debates, Dutch historian Van
Stipriaan has made a telling distinction between ‘white’ and ‘black’ per-
spectives. His argument is well worth quoting at some length. He charac-
terises the ‘black’ discourse as subaltern, Afro-centric, anti-colonial and
inspired by US debates on slavery as the Black Holocaust and hence the
claim to reparations. The ‘white’ discourse, in his perspective, is ‘not white
of an intrinsically racist character’ and actually even anti-racist, but top-
down, paternalistic, a product of the political, cultural and scholarly estab-
lishment. Van Stipriaan, himself a white, well-established historian with
strong links to the Caribbean communities, thinks of himself as one of the
few ‘desperately’ trying to build bridges between the two [discourses]’
(Van Stipriaan 2006: 169).
There is a point in this distinction. At the turn of the millennium, the
Dutch establishment engaged with a certain eagerness to the challenge to
‘do good’, to speak out against moral flaws of the nation in a distant past,
to present conciliatory gestures. The new-found consistency was often
summarised in affirmations to the effect that there was a hideous inconsis-
tency in thinking of the Dutch Golden Age of economic and political as-
cendancy, religious and philosophical toleration and Rembrandt without
also acknowledging this period as the starting period of the nation’s invol-
vement in the Atlantic slave trade. So initially, there was something of a
feel-good dimension to all of this, coupled with political considerations
akin to the multiculturalism paradigm and the accompanying commitment
to inclusionary politics, as in the broadening of the narrative of the nation.
It soon turned out that there were more radical expectations within the
Caribbean community. Anyone engaged in debates on the issue of slavery
and its contemporary legacies was soon bound to be caught in heated
debates on legitimacy, black-versus-white perspectives and eventually the
question of apologies and reparations. Liberal white historians, operating
within a reconciliatory mode, could easily find themselves exposed to
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criticism of high-jacking a ‘black’ issue or, at best, of realising that their
contributions were met with distrust and, at times, overt hostility by radical
Afro-Caribbean protagonists.
Van Stipriaan encapsulates this well – even if perhaps not particularly
encouraging to the present author – in his comments on two books edited
for the Prince Claus Fund in 1999 and 2001. The first, in Dutch, made a
chapter case for commemoration and a monument in the Netherlands,
while the second, in English, provided a broader comparative context.
These books have certainly influenced debates within the white dis-
course. Within the Black discourse they have played no role what-
soever in the Netherlands, with the exception that the editor of both
books, Oostindie, is considered as belonging to ‘them’. (Van
Stipriaan 2006: 168 referring to Oostindie 1999 and Oostindie
2001)
This probably correct observation begs many questions. The first issue
seems of a conceptual nature, but has a wider epistemological significance.
Much of Van Stipriaan’s ‘white discourse’ actually refers to the field of
academia, the terrain of white as well as, indeed, a minority of black his-
torians. Much of his ‘black discourse’, by contrast, is about grass roots
feelings, memories and wisdoms that operate at an altogether different
level. Within academia, there is, by definition, room for dissonance based
on argumentation. In the field of the humanities, there is also a growing
awareness of the significance and inevitability of multivocality. Yet it
seems a risky – and to the present writer, in the end untenable – position
to juxtapose two fundamentally different types of discourse as somehow of
a same nature. After all, scholarship has higher claims than providing ‘just
another perspective’ on, say, the origins of mankind, the treatment of can-
cer, quantum mechanics or the historical phenomenon of slavery. For that
reason, we may well accept the fact that some feel there is a ‘white dis-
course’ out there that does not answer their needs in remembering slavery
and pondering its legacies. But accepting that fact does not imply that
scholarship need apologize for its own methods and epistemological
claims.
While this argument leads to a rejection of the scholarly validity of the
black-white dichotomy, there is also a sobering strategic concern. The same
representative sample who ranked Dutch slave trade and slavery as the
most shameful episode in national history demonstrated little sympathy for
reparations (De Geschiedeniskrant 26 March 2008). More broadly, the
growing popularity of right-wing populism in Dutch society and politics
suggests that the room for a radical ‘black discourse’ to reach any broad
backing seems slight. Wide disenchantment with the multiculturalism para-
digm actually means that the liberal ‘white discourse’ itself is at the
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defence. It might be wise therefore to think again about thinking of the dif-
ferences between these two perspectives as crucial – there is another white
world out there with little patience for either of Van Stipriaan’s perspec-
tives. This, incidentally, is one reason some influential African American
intellectuals will not have anything to do with the reparations claim, feel-
ing that it will only backfire on more moderate accomplishments in the
civil rights movement (Torpey 2006: 122-123, 127).
Next, there are the questions about to what extent a professional histor-
ian should engage in this type of considerations in the first place and how
a historian can relate to the fashionable cultural studies’ concept of multi-
vocality in this context. Both questions will be addressed below. But first
some of the contents of the black-versus-white controversy in Dutch poli-
tics should be discussed. From this short survey, it will become clear that,
as Van Stipriaan rightly observes, the ‘white’ perspective defines a good
deal of the Caribbean participants as well – which again raises the question
of whether this bipolar terminology is analytically helpful rather than
confusing.
What have been the issues at stake? A good introduction is provided in
a book co-authored by Van Stipriaan, Heilbron, Bijnaar and Smeulders, all
linked in some way to NINSEE. In Op zoek naar de stilte (‘In search of
the silence’), as the title indicates, the authors – three of Caribbean origins
– assume that Dutch involvement in the Atlantic slave trade and slavery
itself has been intentionally put to rest ever since emancipation. The book
intends to disclose hidden or forgotten legacies of this history in the
Netherlands itself. Their tour brings us to museums that never before gave
the black servants in their master paintings much thought; to archives and
libraries containing a wealth of data, interpretations, ideals and prejudice;
to associations and institutions claiming to operate from a genuine African
diaspora perspective; to specialists in oral history and oral traditions refer-
ring to the slavery period; to participants in debates about legacies and
trauma and so on (Van Stipriaan, Heilbron, Bijnaar & Smeulders 2007).
Op zoek naar de stilte offers many perspectives and certainly the first-
ever attempt to provide a broader perspective on the ways slavery is or is
not remembered in the Netherlands. The book confirms the perhaps sad
but, after all, rather obvious conclusion that the slavery past has far more
significance to descendants of once enslaved Africans than to white Dutch
citizens and makes the normative point that this history should be accepted
as a shared past for all Dutch people – this is of course fully in line with
the liberal progressive politics that led the Dutch government to create a
national monument and NINSEE in the first place.
New, refreshing but at times also worrying is the extensive discussion of
the wide divergence in the way Dutch people of various backgrounds think
about slavery and its legacies. Not surprisingly, much of what Op zoek
naar de stilte details here concurs with Van Stipriaan’s analysis of a divide
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between white and black discourse. Extreme Afro-Centric positions are
cited, e.g. the affirmation that white historians cannot possibly write a reli-
able history of slavery: ‘You don’t ask Nazis to write the history of the
concentration camps either!’ (e.g. Van Stipriaan et al. 2007: 121). But per-
haps the more important observation is that within the Afro-Caribbean
community in the Netherlands, too, there is a wide variety of ideas about
slavery and its legacies.
What are these contestations all about? To start with, there are disputes
about the legitimacy of intellectual and organisational leadership. Since the
1990s, a series of grass roots groups has been involved in the debate about
slavery and the urge to recognise this past as integral to Dutch history.
Dutch government recognition of the validity of these claims resulted in in-
stitutionalisation and a long series of projects entailing black and white
cooperation and bridging. What transpires from Op zoek naar de stilte is
that most participants value the results so far with a mix of satisfaction and
uneasiness, but equally that there is dissonance within the Afro-Caribbean
community. Thus, some radical grass-roots organisations perceive of
national institutions now put in place, NINSEE, in particular, as too
moderate.
What, then, is moderation? Which approaches generally banned from
the ‘white discourse’ seem to be eschewed by NINSEE as well? Basically,
these refer to concepts and approaches derived from radical African
American discourse, such as the terminology of the Black Holocaust, the
discourse of dehumanisation and cultural trauma, the insistence on formal
Dutch apologies, more reparations and so on. Anyone following NINSEE
over its first five years of existence will have perceived a delicate balan-
cing act between responding to the claims of the more radical elements in
its Afro constituency and fulfilling its bridging mission towards a wider
and, after all, predominantly white society. That act was not always consis-
tent or successful, but bearing in mind NINSEE’s conflicting positions, it
could hardly have been otherwise.
8.5 Black Atlantic orientations and the concept of cultural
trauma
The Dutch ‘rediscovery’ of Atlantic slavery is part of a wider trend in
Europe and the Americas and testifies to the impact of the Black Atlantic.
Not all countries with a slavery past have responded in the same way to
claims for recognition. Within Europe, France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom have been more responsive and self-critical than Portugal
or Spain, a difference that may be accounted for by divergent cultural and
political traditions and certainly by reference to the dissimilar volume and
political clout of metropolitan Afro communities.
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Debates and claims regarding slavery and its legacies have increasingly
become framed in a seemingly delocalised transnational discourse that, at
the end of the day, discloses a heavy predilection for radical African
American perspectives grounded in US realities. At times, then, supposedly
broad African diasporic conceptualisations might well be a mere trans-
planting of American ideas and realities to other contexts. This skipping
over past and present differences in time and place is not necessarily useful
to understand either the realities of slavery nor to weigh its contemporary
legacies. Again, some examples from the Dutch debates may illustrate this
point.
Terminology is an obvious illustration of American derivation, as seen
in the use of the conceptually disputable and politically provocative notion
of the Black Holocaust. The claim of ‘reparations’ is another idea inspired
by US debates. These are appropriations one can appreciate or not, but
there is no reason to propose these American concepts be less (or more)
appropriate in a European – or, for that matter, Caribbean or Latin
American – context. But once we read about black-versus-white perspec-
tives, about a white ‘silencing’ of the past or about generalised legacies of
slavery, historians should make amends.
American interpretations of slavery and its legacies are rooted in a
unique historical experience with unique implications for race relations.
Perhaps inevitably, the stark racial divide characterising US society both
during and after slavery translated in strongly oppositional understandings
of slavery and its legacies. Hence, the emergence and popularity of the
idea of mutually irreconcilable perspectives, grounded in a long history of
brutal suppression and cultural resistance, proudly celebrated by the civil
rights’ movement and given new credential by cultural studies’ insistence
on the inevitability and, indeed, legitimacy of partial truths and emic
discourse.
Yet any historian of the Americas will appreciate that the US record of
slavery and post-slavery and race relations is only one out of many models,
a uniquely grim bipolar model at that. Throughout Latin America and even
in the non-Spanish Caribbean, society and race relations during slavery
and certainly after emancipation were not necessarily less violent, but cer-
tainly more fluid and ended up producing societies that defy the notion of
bipolarity. To be sure, there was and has remained a class-cum-colour
social hierarchy, persistent racism and so on. But it simply does not make
sense to think of these societies and how its citizens think of themselves
primarily in terms of ‘race’ and a black-versus-white polarity.
Narrowing understandings of slavery and its legacies to a simple divi-
sion in a black-versus-white discourse therefore misses much of the com-
plexities of the wider Afro-American experience. This should worry not
just historians, but anyone engaged in the debate on the contemporary rele-
vance of slavery. How, for instance, are we to understand the concept of
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‘silencing the past’ itself? The idea gained currency with Trouillot’s semi-
nal book, Silencing the past. Trouillot’s argument is straightforward. There
are hegemonic versions of history that tend to actively silence subaltern
voices. He applies this paradigm specifically to the ‘unremembering’ of the
Haitian Revolution and the quincentenary of Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the
New World (Trouillot 1995).
Seen from this perspective, one understands the popularity of the recur-
ring trope of ‘unsilencing’ the slavery past – and indeed the title of Op
zoek naar de stilte. The big question, however, is whether it really makes
sense to always think of this kind of silence as engineered, as actively im-
posed by hegemonic forces. If one US plantation mansion converted into a
museum tells a wondrous story about the antebellum Deep South while
skipping over the harsh realities of slavery, yes, then the conclusion of
silencing seems astute (Eichstedt & Small 2002). But how much credence
can we give the idea of a determined political project of silencing the
Dutch slavery past without taking into account that, unlike the Americas,
there were hardly any slaves in the metropolis during slavery or Afro-
Caribbean migrants afterwards and, subsequently, hardly any pre-1970s ex-
posure to this grim and shameful history and its migratory aftermath? Or,
from another angle, should we then also conclude that the persistent ne-
glect of the Dutch participation in Asian slave trade and slavery is another
instance of deliberate silencing – and, if so, by what hegemonic power and
why?
In the Dutch debates, as elsewhere, dehumanisation and cultural trauma
are recurrent concepts in the debate about slavery. Anyone familiar with
travelogues, planters’ manuals and abolitionist writings from the slavery
period will recognise the idea of dehumanisation (see Davis 2006). This
idea of dehumanisation has found its contemporary translation in the idea
of cultural trauma (e.g. Alexander 2004; Eyerman 2001). This trauma, in
turn, is sometimes advanced to explain psychological problems such as
low self-esteem, underachievement and deviance. The very idea of cultural
trauma and its consequences is fiercely debated, and it makes little sense to
discern between a black trauma versus a white discourse in this respect – if
only because another, often overlapping black discourse emphasises pre-
cisely the agency and resistance of enslaved Africans and their descen-
dants.
Yet, it may be worthwhile to consider again how this trauma metaphor
works out in the Dutch debates and how the arguments relate to empirical
research (for a more extensive discussion, see Oostindie 2008c: especially
14-18). First, let us look at the concept of cultural trauma itself, which
refers to a collective memory of a shocking formative period transmitted
over several generations to the point that this memory becomes crucial to
group identity. Trauma in this context refers not only, and perhaps not even
primarily, to the dehumanising experience of slavery itself, but also and
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perhaps more to the internalisation of racism and the deep disillusions of
the post-slavery period. Trauma, the argument runs, inhibited the descen-
dants to fully exploit the chances presented by freedom, and initiated a
vicious and as yet unbroken circle of feelings of inferiority, lack of initia-
tive and irresponsible behaviour.
The reasoning is not new. Contemporaries observed that European colo-
nial slavery dehumanised the enslaved (as well the enslavers). This reason-
ing found its way to modern historiography in concepts such as ‘dehuma-
nisation’ and ‘traumatisation’. In political debates, this way of thinking is
expressed in the thesis of internalised racism and self-victimisation. One
line of argumentation emphasises the narrow limits of post-emancipation
freedom and, hence, the imposition of marginality. The other, not necessa-
rily opposing perspective, stresses internalisation of racism, resulting in
low self-esteem and unconsciously chosen victimhood and hence irrespon-
sible behaviour.
This approach is also discernible in debates on the legacies of slavery in
the Dutch orbit, emic as well as etic. Such debates require precision, empa-
thy and, among the descendants, the courage to speak out about delicate
emotions. Yet, it remains problematic that the references to trauma remain
speculative and ill-defined. We have no way of establishing what propor-
tion of the descendants of enslaved Africans feels victimised in which
ways and degrees, conscious or unconscious – individual suffering does
not equal collective trauma. Moreover, the possible relation between ‘trau-
ma’ and real-life behaviour is speculative. One should also wonder whether
possible feelings of victimhood are eventually rooted in the period of slav-
ery or rather in the subsequent period.
Such objections need to be taken serious. The contemporary template of
Caribbean – and, to a lesser extent, Latin American – slavery bears the
strong imprint of the US hegemony in Atlantic studies. Local specificity is
often absent. But New World slavery was not uniform and neither was
post-emancipation history, so we should not expect similar contemporary
outcomes. Historical scrutiny, therefore, is crucial.
Indeed, most of the historiography of the last decades emphasises the
vitality and agency of the enslaved, ranging from open and covert resis-
tance to cultural creativity – and, hence, implicitly undermines the idea of
collective trauma under slavery. The more or less hegemonic contemporary
paradigm holds that no matter how repressive and alienating slavery in the
Americas may have been, it did not really dehumanise its victims.
Moreover, there were significant regional and longitudinal variants in
Atlantic slavery. The lives of New World slaves were enacted between the
extremes of subjugation and resistance. The seemingly outdated concept of
‘accommodation’, utilised in the study of foreign occupations, prisons and
even concentration camps, is still a useful analytical tool. One crucial
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contrast is that Caribbean slaves over time struggled to obtain more de-
grees of freedom, more autonomy within enslavement.
Two more comments on the idea of slavery trauma seem appropriate.
The first relates to identity politics and political opportunity structures.
Recent research on collective or cultural trauma stresses the processes in
which past occurrences are or are not transformed into collective contem-
porary trauma. The emphasis on distinction is crucial. Not all communities
define past suffering as traumatic, nor do all societies tolerate and/or sup-
port signifying institutions. This implies that not only the recognition, but
the very existence, of collective trauma depends to a large extent on choice,
both by descendants of past victims and the societies they inhabit.
A second comment refers to the issue of transgenerational transmission
of trauma. Recent research of victims of traumatic events – in particular,
survivors of the Holocaust – suggests a remarkable and successful determi-
nation among the majority to shield their children from their own trauma
(Sagi-Schwartz, Abraham, M.H. van IJzendoorn, K.E. Grossmann, T.
Joels, K. Grossmann, M. Scharf, N. Koren-Karie & S. Alkalay 2003; M.H.
van IJzendoorn, M.J. Bakermans-Kranenburg & A. Sagi-Schwartz 2003).
There seems to be no good reason to assume that Africans and their des-
cendants, many generations away from the traumas of the middle passage
and slavery, would think and act otherwise – perhaps the frustrations which
led to the cultural trauma paradigm lie primarily in the present?
It is exceedingly difficult to answer such questions. Suffice it to con-
clude here that there is no scholarly substantiation – or refutation, for that
matter – of the idea of transgenerationally transmitted slavery trauma and
that explanations for contemporary behaviour referring to cultural trauma
lack empirical substantiation and precision.
8.6 Slavery trauma in the Dutch orbit
The above section should be understood as a plea for analytical transpar-
ency and nuance rather than as an a priori refutation of the idea of slavery
trauma. What we need is rigour alongside empathy, as well as an under-
standing of local specificities, then and now. This point may be illustrated
by a brief discussion of three ‘Dutch Caribbean’ debates in which trauma
is often evoked (Oostindie 2008c: especially 17-18).
The concept of internalised racism is neither new nor far-fetched.
Centuries of exposure to racism left deep scars among the descendants of
enslaved Africans, no matter how often white Dutch might have ridiculed
or denied this. The challenge of mental redemption has been expressed by
countless Afro-American leaders, intellectuals and artists. Inspired by the
Haitian Revolution, the enslaved African Tula led a major slave revolt on
Curaçao in 1795, arguing that all men are equal and entitled to live as
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such. Some 70 years ago, the Surinamese activist and writer Anton de
Kom criticised the ‘slave mentality’ of his compatriots. One still finds ob-
sessions about blackness and ‘improving’ one’s colour throughout the
Black Atlantic decades after the ‘Black is beautiful’ concept was coined
and Bob Marley’s famous ‘Redemption song’ urged: ‘Emancipate yourself
from mental slavery/None but ourselves can free our minds.’
Ignoring such cultural legacies is at once pointless and demonstrates a
lack of respect. But it remains an altogether different question whether
such individual frustrations and pain should really be understood as collec-
tive trauma. Perhaps historians cannot bring much light to this debate. But
serious historical research will underline once more the crucial distinctions
of time and place. Just as New World slavery had many variants, so did
race relations during and after slavery. This much is confirmed by decades
of comparative research. Hence, the hypothesis that the evident historical
variation resulted in divergent contemporary psychological legacies of
slavery in the African diaspora. The historically unique case of US race
relations should not be taken as a generalised Atlantic model for either his-
tory or its contemporary political and psychological legacies.
Next we turn to the oft-cited causal relation between slavery, trauma and
deviant behaviour. Over the past decades, some 40 per cent of the total
Curaçaoan population has settled in the Netherlands. A small but dispro-
portional share of this group engages in often violent criminal behaviour.
Frequently, the behaviour is explained with reference to slavery – much as
it was before in debates about high rates of deviance among lower-class
Afro-Surinamese or indeed of youth on Curaçao itself. Key terms in the
discourse are low self-esteem, poor social and linguistic skills, macho be-
haviour, a culture of shame, failing socialisation and, in particular, matrifo-
cality with its related images of teenage mothers and absent fathers. The
link to slavery is easily made. Thus, some years ago the official representa-
tive body of Antilleans in the Netherlands known as the Overlegorgaan
Caraïbische Nederlanders (OCAN) held a conference on what was referred
to as ‘collective trauma derived from the slavery past’. The ‘slavery trau-
ma’ was defined among Antilleans as an ‘unhealed – and unshared – psy-
chic wound that is transmitted through the generations and makes victims
into perpetrators’, with potentially significant consequences ‘for mutual
trust, self image and self-confidence, family life or child-rearing’. At the
same time, the report emphasises that many disadvantaged Afro-Caribbean
people ‘manage to liberate themselves from a subculture of poverty and
collective trauma (OCAN 2006: 11). Again, this type of ‘explanation’ lacks
precision. There was and is a broad variety of practices in kinship and up-
bringing, both during and after slavery in different parts of Afro-America.
Dutch Caribbean slavery respected the integrity of slave families far more
than was the case in the US. Moreover, matrifocality need not result in a
deficient childhood and education. Part of the contemporary problems with
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Curaçaoan youth derive not from the distant past, but from recent develop-
ments: the exodus to the Netherlands and the resulting destruction of pre-
viously functioning family networks. In addition, the external factors of
geography and globalisation dictated the emergence of narco-trafficking as
a hugely profitable crime-generating sector on the island and in the
Netherlands. Curaçaoans are indeed disproportionately active in this sector,
but slavery trauma provides no hard explanation in this respect and matri-
focality based in slavery provides, at best, a remotely partial one. Undue
emphasis on an alleged chain of causality that linked slavery in the
Caribbean to integration problems in the Netherlands reminds one of
Bosma’s remarks in his introduction to this book on a ‘culture of
victimhood’.
Finally, what about the relevance of slavery and its legacies in contem-
porary debates about decolonisation and politics? Surely, the determination
to part with a metropolis once responsible for slavery has been a strong
element in Caribbean nationalist discourse – indeed, Surinamese political
nationalism is a point in case. Yet the use of ‘slavery’ in debates about pol-
itics and, in particular, about the present constitutional status of the Dutch
Antillean islands seems unproductive.
Unlike Surinam, the six Dutch Antillean islands have adamantly refused
the Dutch ‘gift’ of sovereignty. The Hague’s policy of bringing the federa-
tion of six to an early independence failed on both accounts: sovereignty is
refused and cannot be imposed, and the six have managed to convince the
Dutch to allow for the dismantlement of the Antilles-of-six. In different
forms, all will end up having separate constitutional and governance links
to the metropolis. The Hague has embarked on a course of strong involve-
ment in local governance leading to Antillean resentment against ‘recoloni-
sation’, but also internal dissent (Oostindie & Klinkers 2003; Oostindie
2008a.)
In the fiery debates on these issues, some protagonists at times invoke
the issue of slavery. This seems not particularly helpful. The debates on
the constitutional future needs another type of argument, an awareness of
geopolitical context and small scale. Antilleans have good reasons to hold
on to the metropolitan lifeline. Some feel this testifies to a slave mentality.
It seems more appropriate to underline that this policy to minimise risk
characterises all non-sovereign territories, wherever in the world and
whether or not their past is scarred by slavery.
This is the crucial point in the Antillean debates as well. Support for in-
dependence is negligible. The bone of contention is really how much
Dutch involvement is acceptable. In these debates one finds much anti-
colonial rhetoric and references to slavery, but the political choices will
remain pragmatic. As the Dutch will not find themselves able to withdraw
from the Caribbean, Antilleans will continue to pick the fruits of their
enslaved African forebears’ victimisation: materially sweet fruits, psycho-
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logically perhaps more bitter ones. No doubt bitterness will continue to in-
spire post-colonial anger and understandable albeit not very productive re-
ferences to the horrors of slavery.
8.7 Historians and the legacies of slavery
In their highly entertaining book Why truth matters (2006), the philoso-
phers Benson and Stangroom advocate scholarly rigour and intersubjectiv-
ity against postmodernist cultural studies’ and other paradigms questioning
the epistemological legitimacy of scholarly claims to uncover ‘truth’. One
argument against relativism exposed in the opening pages of the book is
worth quoting in full.
There are true facts about, for instance, how many people were
murdered in horrible terrifying degrading circumstances in any one
of history’s many instances of massacres, war crimes and ethnic
cleansings. (Benson & Stangroom 2006: 1)
No serious scholar of slavery could object to this statement, but it is as
legitimate to engage in debates about the total volume of the Atlantic slave
trade as it is to wonder aloud whether or how this particular trade is unique
in world history, whether it should be classified among ‘massacres, war
crimes and ethnic cleansings’, perhaps even as a Black Holocaust, or rather
as something altogether different. Scholars should feel free to ask these
and many other sensitive questions and should not be unduly concerned by
questions of black-versus-white perspectives. And yet, in dealing with the
issues of slavery, legacies and racism, no historian can ignore ethical and
political sensitivities – and certainly, as Bosma points out in this book’s
introduction, no historian can circumvent the uneasiness of remaining
‘pockets of silence’ in a post-colonial world.
In this context, it is useful to return briefly to Van Stipriaan’s reviews of
the debate in the Netherlands and particularly the problematic distinction
between ‘white’ and ‘black’ discourse. These two ‘discourses’ may cover
much of the debate in Dutch Caribbean circles, but certainly not the entire
spectrum in Dutch society, where leading populist politicians state that
even the liberal ‘white’ discourse suffers from political correctness and
unwarranted antinationalist sentiment. For historians, the more pressing
question is how to prevent the study of slavery and its legacies from be-
coming divided in such closed compartments. Serious scholarship can and
should defend itself against the idea of being ‘just another discourse’.
Much has been made in recent decades about ‘multivocality’. Yet, while
every serious scholar should allow for the fact that people experience and
remember all sort of things differently today than in the past, a radical
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reduction of interpretations to a priori positions or perspectives is no ser-
ious scholarly alternative to the comparative historical method.
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at conferences of the Association of
Caribbean Historians (Paramaribo, 12-16 May 2008) and the Society for Multi-
Ethnic Studies (MESA) (Leiden, 25-28 June 2008). Pieter Emmer and Alex van
Stipriaan provided much-appreciated comments on it. The present version was pub-
lished earlier in a slightly different version in Klooster (2009: 305-327).
2 Emmer (2006); Kardux (2004); Oostindie (2003, 2005b, 2001); Van Stipriaan
(2001, 2004, 2006). Much more is written on this issue, but these references are to
works in English.
3 The 2004 census presents ambiguous figures. The proportion of Surinamese of
Asian origin is 42 per cent (27.4 per cent Hindustani and 14.6 per cent Javanese).
At 32.4 per cent (17.7 per cent Urban Creole and 14.7 per cent Maroon), the propor-
tion of Surinamese of African origins seems much lower, though we have reason to
think that the ‘Mixed’ category (12.5 per cent) mainly also comprises people of
African origins. Other census categories are ‘Other’ (6.5 per cent, comprising
Amerindians, Brazilians, Chinese and Europeans) and ‘Unknown’ (6.6 per cent).
4 The argument in 2005 did not concern Verdonk’s opinions about slavery and com-
memoration – but rather her tough anti-migration policies (speech of Rita Verdonk,
Amsterdam, 3 April 2008).
5 For a reprint of the Drescher chapter and a dozen comments providing a compara-
tive perspective on Dutch abolition and emancipation, see Oostindie (1995, 1996).
6 Due to space restrictions, the practice and memory of slavery in the former Dutch
colonies in Africa is not discussed here (see Oostindie 2005b, 2008b).
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